sexta-feira, 12 de junho de 2009

O Osama outra vez

Não sei porquê, mas desinformação chateia-me. E chateia-me mesmo a sério. De tempos a tempos, para se pressionar o botão do medo, lá se lembram de recitar o nome do Osama Bin Laden (ou seja lá qual for a transliteração que estejam a utilizar no momento) para nos lembrarem da guerra ao terror e que ela deve mesmo ser mantida.

Chateado como estou decidi trazar um bocado de jornalismo não soundbite, informado, e estruturado só para variar. Sim, eu sei que é uma chatice termos que ler notícias grandes e que não se limitam a transmitir as comuns banalidades de fast-news, mas faça o esforço e depois diga de sua justiça.

Eu que nada tenho a ver com jornalismo semprei achei que tinha a ver com informar. Que tinha a ver com analisar. Que tinha a ver com imparcialidade e verdade. Quão enganado estava. Enfim, inocências pueris tão próprias de jovens idealistas que depois levam umas chapadas da vida...

Ficam cá alguns trechos e no final o link para o artigo completo (bolds e itálicos devem-se totalmente a mim):

"Seven years after Osama bin Laden's last verifiable appearance among the living, there is more evidence for Elvis's presence among us than for his. Hence there is reason to ask whether the paradigm of Osama bin Laden as terrorism's deus ex machina and of al Qaeda as the prototype of terrorism may be an artifact of our Best and Brightest's imagination, and whether investment in this paradigm has kept our national security establishment from thinking seriously about our troubles' sources."

"The audio and video tapes alleged to be Osama's never convinced impartial observers. The guy just does not look like Osama. Some videos show him with a Semitic aquiline nose, while others show him with a shorter, broader one. Next to that, differences between colors and styles of beard are small stuff. "

"Nor does the tapes' Osama sound like Osama. In 2007 Switzerland's Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence, which does computer voice recognition for bank security, compared the voices on 15 undisputed recordings of Osama with the voices on 15 subsequent ones attributed to Osama, to which they added two by native Arab speakers who had trained to imitate him and were reading his writings. All of the purported Osama recordings (with one falling into a gray area) differed clearly from one another as well as from the genuine ones. By contrast, the CIA found all the recordings authentic. It is hard to imagine what methodology might support this conclusion. "

"Lawrence noted as well that the Osama figure in the December 2001 video, which many have taken as his assumption of responsibility for 9/11, wears golden rings—decidedly un-Wahhabi. He also writes with the wrong hand."

"We do not know what happened to Osama. But whatever happened, the original one, the guy who looked and sounded like a spoiled Saudi kid turned ideologue, is no more. The one who exists in the tapes is different: he is the world's terror master, endowed with inexplicable influence. In short, whoever is making the post-November 2001 Osama tapes is pretending to far greater power than Osama ever claimed, much less exercised. "

"Osama's (late) role in Afghanistan's anti-Soviet resistance was to bring in a little money. Arab fighters in general, and particularly the few Osama brought, fought rarely and badly"

"There is a good reason why neither Osama nor al Qaeda appeared on U.S. intelligence screens until 1998. They had done nothing noteworthy."

"More important, focusing on Osama and al Qaeda distorts our understanding of what is happening in Afghanistan. The latter-day Taliban are fielding forces better paid and armed than any in the region except America's. Does anyone suggest seriously that Osama or al-Zawahiri are providing the equipment, the money, or the moral incentives? Such amounts of money can come only from the super wealthy of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The equipment can come only through dealers who work at the sufferance of states, and can reach the front only through Pakistan by leave of Pakistani authorities. Moreover, the moral incentives for large-scale fighting in Pushtunistan can come only as part of the politics of Pushtun identity. Hence sending troops to Afghanistan to fight Pushtuns financed by Saudis, supported by Pakistanis, and disposing of equipment purchased throughout the world, with the objective of "building an Afghan nation" capable of preventing Osama and al Qaeda from messing up the world from their mountain caves, is an errand built on intellectual self-indulgence. "

"The force of the CIA's judgments, its authority, has always come from the congruence between its prejudices and those of America's ruling class. When you tell people what they want to hear, you don't have to be too careful about premises, facts, and conclusions."


Não concordo com algumas das coisas ditas no artigo (especialmente o facto de ter deixado de fora que os Estados Unidos devem ser o país com mais cumplicidade em actos de terrorismo internacional), mas soube-me muito bem ler este questionamento da sabedoria convencional feito por uma revista conservadora dos E.U.A.


Parte I
Parte II

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