Federalist papers

From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.

As democracias são más porque são incompatíveis com segurança pessoal e a existência de propriedade privada...

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.

Ou seja o pequeno grupo eleito de cidadãos, só pelo facto de ter sido eleito, torna-se sábio (a outra opção é que a ralé de facto consegue eleger os mais sábios. Mas neste caso pergunto se um grupo de pessoas consegue de facto eleger um grupo de sábios para os representar porque precisam eles de eleger?) e a partir daí têm como desígnio inferir os verdadeiros interesses do país (sim, porque os boçais que têm sabedoria suficiente para eleger os homens que vão guiar o país não têm sabedoria suficiente para guiarem eles próprios o país) de maneira patriótica, justa e sem qualquer falha...

Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose.

Isto é tão cómico que de facto nem merece comentários. Mas para sermos justos também temos isto:

On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:

In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the Representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.

Gostava imenso de saber de onde tira Publius essa conclusão. Uma vez que não apresenta um argumento (não apresenta nada digno desse nome) só posso assumir que, como muito bem se diz por terras do tio Sam, "He took it out of his ass!"

E para finalizar:

A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.

Uma divisão equitativa da propriedade é visto como algo impróprio ou projecto malvado. Realmente isto de querer oportunidades iguais para todos é de uma malvadice que só lembra a pior corja que por aí anda.

O texto que por agora cito encontra-se aqui na íntegra.